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A whole-of-society approach 
to wildlife crime in South Africa 
*  Dr Duarte Gonçalves is based at the Defence, Peace, Safety and 
Security Unit of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
where he leads a group focused on whole-of-society approaches 
to security problems and the capabilities required to address them. 
The recent and rapid increase in wildlife crime threatens not only the survival of significant populations 
of endangered species in South Africa but also regional security, the sustainability of the tourism sector 
and the social stability of communities. Many wildlife crime interventions fail to achieve sustained 
impact due to the complexity of the crime. Different aspects of the problem are interconnected, 
but stakeholders address them in parts. This causes some to view the problem as too complex to 
address, thus promoting a state of crisis management. Addressing wildlife crime requires harmonising 
efforts, incorporating on-the-ground cross-border cooperation that balances conserving wildlife with 
stakeholder needs for socio-economic development and local, national and regional stability. This 
article explores innovative and integrated ways to mitigate the complexity of wildlife crime, framed as a 




Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse pose 
significant risks to the planet.1 Damage is 
caused by a range of factors, including climate 
change, crime and inadequate governance. In 
South Africa, wildlife crime poses a significant 
threat to biodiversity, communities and tourism. 
It promotes ecological degradation, counteracts 
conservation efforts and poses a threat to the 
sustainable development and use of natural 
resources. It also exploits socio-economically 
vulnerable communities. Additionally, some 
communities on the borders of protected 
areas use socio-political issues to justify 
poaching as a form of protest.2 Corruption often 
accompanies wildlife crime. From the glamorous 
Big Five to the forgotten cycad, wildlife crime 
threatens many species, often with limited 
consequences for the perpetrator. 
Before it was designated as a national security 
threat by the South African government in 2016, 
the Department of Environmental Affairs was 
responsible for dealing with rhino poaching.3 
After reclassification, this responsibility was 
transferred to the South African Police Service 
(SAPS), supported by other components of the 
government’s security cluster. Implicit in this 
shift was a recognition that wildlife crime has 
a transnational organised crime component, 
that the associated corruption undermines 
governance and efforts to deal with poaching, 
and that a multi-sectoral strategy is needed to 
address it.  
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Wildlife crime presents decision and 
policymakers with an opportunity for policy 
innovation. The interventions required for 
other complex challenges, such as addressing 
climate change or entrenched gang activity 
in Cape Town, lie outside the mandate of a 
single department or stakeholder. The same 
is true of wildlife crime. South Africa’s National 
Development Plan (NDP) 2030 is an example of 
a holistic, whole-of-government and civil society 
vision of how to deal with such interconnected 
challenges.4 Whole-of-society approaches are 
applicable to most 21st century governance, 
especially in relation to macro-level socio-
economic targets. 
Using rhino poaching as an example, this 
article suggests that a whole-of-society 
approach to addressing wildlife crime in South 
Africa is urgently needed, with a specific focus 
on implementation.5 
The need for a whole-of-society 
approach
In this section, the need for a whole-of-society 
approach is outlined with particular focus on 
a security studies perspective, a policy and 
strategy implementation perspective, and in 
relation to the complexity of wildlife crime.
A security studies perspective
Governments might label an act as ‘criminal’ 
to justify criminal justice and force-related 
interventions.6 In response to rhino poaching 
in South Africa, government-run wildlife parks 
have introduced surveillance technology and 
transformed park rangers into response forces. 
As such, poaching and associated crimes have 
changed how parks are managed and staffed.
McDonald has argued that states tend to 
define security narrowly, primarily through the 
designation of threats, with a focus on the 
moment in which state agents might intervene.7 
The August 2016 event in Nice, France, where 
a driver steered a truck into a crowd of people, 
illustrates the difficulty of intercepting ‘criminals’ 
at the moment when the offence takes place.8 
The United States, Netherlands and United 
Kingdom governments have in recent years 
reconsidered the balance between the four 
security chain tasks, namely analysis, prevention, 
response and evaluation.9 Security efforts and 
spending tend to focus on the response to 
incidents, while prevention receives the least 
attention. Reconsidering the balance requires 
a shift from a state-centric to a human-centric 
approach to security that considers the needs of 
communities and individuals.10 The broadening 
human and environmental dimensions of security 
and the asymmetric nature of security threats 
require departments that are traditionally non-
security to work more closely with security-
related departments.11 
South Africa also tends to focus on the response 
to wildlife crime, mainly via law enforcement. 
As South African government departments 
become larger and more specialised, knowledge, 
information and capabilities remain ‘siloed’; 
meanwhile, the ability of organisations to respond 
to rapid change or uncertainty in the environment 
requires high levels of integration.12 
Implementation
Integration of the work performed by government 
departments and other entities is essential if 
the complex security risks facing South Africa 
are to be addressed. Research suggests that 
organisations working to address wildlife crime 
may understand the subject and associated 
challenges very differently from others working 
in the same area.13 Part of the reason for this 
is that organisations have different mandates, 
which determine what information is gathered 
and how it is interpreted. On the spectrum of 
coordination, information sharing is an important 
but limited element, surpassed by collaboration 
and cross-organisational strategic collaboration 
(Figure 1).14 When addressing complex problems, 
sharing information is necessary, but not 
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sufficient. Rather, a cross-organisational strategy 
is required, where role players agree on shared 
strategies and methods.15 Nonetheless, with 
the global growth of accessible information 
technology and systems, some parties believe 
that information sharing is adequate. This view 
ignores stakeholder interests, which could 
disrupt, stall or undermine any joint effort. 
 
The successful implementation of strategies 
in the case of a single organisation can be as 
low as 10%.17 Organisational cultures should 
be realigned to ensure behaviour change by 
employees, and funds reallocated to ensure 
successful implementation. In addition, building 
capabilities to address wildlife crime in a 
sustainable way requires multiple disciplines, 
traditionally organised as silos.18 Social sciences, 
natural sciences, engineering and technology 
are key to these capabilities.19 
Common governmental responses to 
governance challenges deal with immediate 
problem solving. Such responses are politically 
expedient and often short-lived (five years 
or less); for example, the South African 
government’s goal to reduce the number of 
rhino poached. Such short-term problem solving 
can increase complexity and cost, but this is 
not immediately apparent since the costs are 
borne by many stakeholders. Ultimately, long-
term visions and investments are required to 
effectively tackle complex challenges such as 
wildlife crime. 
Complexity and wildlife crime
Understanding the complexity of wildlife 
crime is important in order to avoid unrealistic 
expectations with regard to how it might be 
addressed. Key factors shaping complexity in 
wildlife crime are: the number of stakeholders 
involved; the high stakes; the potential/necessity 
for numerous simultaneous interventions; and 
the specific dynamics of rhino poaching. These 
are explored below.
The involvement of multiple stakeholders 
Wildlife crime involves and affects multiple states 
and their governments, each with a multiplicity 
of interests and agendas. States may have their 
own legislation for wildlife crime. In South Africa, 
wildlife crime spans the mandates of at least 10 
government departments, and each department 
approaches the problem(s) through the lens of 
their mandate.20 Similarly, elements of the private 
sector, civil society and various communities 
are invested in the matter. With regard to rhino 
poaching, South African communities bordering 
wildlife parks are often affected by, or involved in, 
poaching. Over 100 stakeholders have interests 
in wildlife or are impacted by wildlife crime in the 
Kruger National Park alone, yet no single person 
or entity is charged with coordination.21
Adding to the complexity of the matter, these 
groups and entities (among others) embody a 
variety of values and interests:
•	Wildlife	products,	sought	for	medicinal	and	
status use in South-east Asia22
•	Conservationists	(parks	and	NGOs),	who	are	




illegality of killing and trafficking rhino.24 For 
traffickers (the middlemen, transporters and 
kingpins), rhino horn is a way to make a living 
•	Communities	around	parks	where	access	has	
been restricted, who want access to hunt, earn 
a living and enter sites of cultural importance 
(e.g. graves and ancestral grounds)25 







Least difficult with important, 
but limited results
Most difficult, but with 
best results
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•	Some	private	rhino	owners,	who	see	rhino	as	
an investment that should yield returns26 
High stakes 
The stakes in rhino poaching depend on the 
various stakeholders. Conservationists fear a 
loss of biodiversity, including the conservation of 
the rhino. Because 80% of the world’s rhino are 
found in South Africa, rhino poaching is a South 
African problem with global repercussions.27 
Where security and rhino are threatened, 
wildlife parks risk a loss of income from tourism. 
Community members who poach rhino or work 
as armed rangers for the parks face the risk 
of injury and death. Communities also benefit 
from these activities, either through legitimate 
employment in the parks or illicit trade in horns. 
Some poachers may believe they have no other 
means to survive. Rhino owners hoping to trade 
their stock have no market in which to do so. 
They must also spend money securing their 
much sought-after stock.
The past and future 
Rhino hunting picked up in the 1970s until 
the mid-1990s and then almost disappeared, 
resurfacing around 2008 for reasons that are 
not entirely clear.28 Wildlife crime networks 
and modus operandi constantly change. For 
example, the majority of incursions have shifted 
from the eastern border to the western border 
of the Kruger Park. Anti-poaching, community 
and other interventions take time and face 
resource constraints. They therefore require a 
long-term vision, but this often varies between 
stakeholders. Interventions are also fluid in 
terms of activities and stakeholders, so must be 
adaptable over time. 
The simultaneity of intervention 
Wildlife crime converges with other crimes 
such as illegal possession of weapons and 
drugs, trespassing, money laundering, fraud, 
corruption, murder, attempted murder and 
entrapment.29 Wildlife crime is also a product 
of broader socio-economic issues such as 
deprivation, inequality and poorly managed 
rural densification (among many others) 
around parks. Without addressing key co-
occurring problems, such as local community 
needs, poaching cannot be prevented. Thus 
simultaneous interventions are necessary, 
ranging from individual to international. At a 
park level, international demand management 
must be addressed at the same time as physical 
security. It is not a matter of ‘either/or’, but of 
‘and’. The challenge is to align interventions 
to ensure maximum effectiveness and impact, 
without producing new harms. 
The case of rhino poaching reveals this web 
of interconnected challenges. While law 
enforcement is frustrated by its inability to get 
ahead of rhino poaching, some law enforcement 
managers refer to their efforts as a ‘war on 
poaching’ and to poachers as ‘insurgents’.30 
Such language suggests armed conflict and 
subversive action against the government. 
But framing it in this way does not help those 
working with communities bordering parks. 
Wildlife parks fragment land and communities. 
Community interventions offer important 
alternatives to ‘militarisation of conservation’, 
but when law enforcers use militaristic language, 
these interventions may be viewed with 
suspicion by community members.31 
Interventions must occur on multiple time-
horizons. From a conservation perspective, the 
most effective leverage point involves changing 
perceptions of the value of rhino horn.32 If this 
is achieved, challenges at other points in the 
value chain will naturally wither, but altering the 
value of horn is not straightforward and may 
take more than five years. However, in order to 
protect the rhino population, immediate action is 
also required. 
Governance is about role players with diverse 
but interconnected interests and worldviews, 
managing the course of events.33 The notion 
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of purely state-centred security governance 
is inadequate, and is better conceptualised 
as polycentric or nodal governance.34 
Polycentric governance is ’the simultaneous 
functioning of multiple centres of governance 
and decision making with different interests, 
perspectives, and values’.35 There have been 
proposals for a whole-of-society approach to 
security governance in South Africa.36 More 
specifically, in the context of poor South African 
communities, the Zwelethemba model was 
developed to promote the effective governance 
of security and justice. Government created 
local institutions or nodes called peace 
committees with a code of good practice.37 
The values espoused were non-violence, 
cooperation and an orientation towards 
the future rather than individual blame for 
community problems. Peace committees 
used community gatherings to achieve two 
outcomes.38 The first was peacemaking; 
i.e., developing responses to disputes and 
conflicts that seek to reduce the likelihood of 
them re-occurring. The second outcome was 
peacebuilding; concerned with addressing local 
problems in a way that reduces their impact 
on the life of the community. Built on previous 
work, the following section presents a whole-of-
society approach, with a specific focus on the 
implementation of capabilities.
The whole-of-society model
Regarding rhino poaching in South Africa, the 




participation in the co-development of 
strategies and capabilities
•	The	complexity	of	wildlife	crime	requires	a	
particular intervention methodology 
In the face of complexity, it is tempting to 
dismiss methodology in favour of ‘practicality’ 
– but this simply results in ‘muddling 
through’.39 The whole-of-society approach, 
illustrated in Figure 2, is developed in this 
section and focuses on capabilities required 
for implementation. It involves creating a 
shared understanding of the current situation, 
developing alternative futures, and proposing 
cross-organisational interventions that take into 
account the capabilities required within different 
enterprises. Depending on the level of the 
intervention, whether local or national, different 
stakeholders will be involved in the process. 
The broad sectors are government departments 
and agencies, NGOs, business, the public in 
general, and communities bordering parks.
Planning ought to be complemented by 
a futures paradigm. Futures studies is the 
systematic study of possible, probable and 
preferable futures and worldviews, and the 
myths and metaphors that underlie each 
future.40 The futures paradigm encourages 
stakeholders to create a preferred future. In 
futures, both forecasting and transformation 
are important. In forecasting, futures studies 
consider a diversity of indicators and variables 
that anticipate outcomes. Including different 
stakeholders in futures processes ensures 
that their interests and actions are understood 
by other participants. Several methods for 
promoting understanding must be used, based 
on the purpose, the type of information to be 
communicated and the set of stakeholders. 
The purpose of such methods is to support 
group thinking rather than to reach a complete 
understanding of the problem. 
A number of products have been developed 
to support understanding in the context of 
rhino poaching, with two examples provided 
here. The first example is the spatial modelling 
of community vulnerability to involvement in 
poaching, which would assist in understanding 
the geographic context of a community 
intervention.41 Inequality and corruption are 
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two factors feeding into this vulnerability and 
have the potential to be exploited by criminals. 
The second example involves performance 
measures. Performance measures such as 
numbers of arrests and convictions serve the 
interests of only some stakeholders, in particular 
law enforcement. Such measures lead to a 
bias towards arresting poachers in protected 
areas. The underlying assumption is that arrests 
and convictions will lead to a reduction in rhino 
poaching. However, if law enforcement is to 
disrupt wildlife crime, then the rate at which law 
enforcers arrest traffickers (middlemen up to 
the kingpins) and disrupt their activities must 
exceed the rate at which traffickers are being 
replaced.42 This is a different goal and, were it to 
be feasible, would require a different measure. 
Thus, futures studies are important in order 
to escape a short-term focus by challenging 
assumptions and particular interests. 
Transformation, the second aspect of futures 
studies, requires changing conscious and 
unconscious beliefs. For example, does 
poaching ‘happen’ as an event or is it ‘grown’? 
If the belief is that poaching happens, then the 
response is to intercept poachers during their 
hunt (in time and place). But if it is understood 
that poaching is grown collectively, different 
interventions can be considered. This may be 
obvious on reflection, yet when it is part of an 
organisational narrative it will hamper progress. 
For example, at a workshop with South African 
government departments the organisational 
narrative was one of ‘we live for the present’.44 
The framing of an issue and the metaphors 
used to explain it may produce different 
interventions, or prevent consensus on an 
intervention, in so doing shutting down possible 
futures.45 Encouraging open-mindedness 
allows for alternative futures to be imagined and 
choices to be made.
From the four generic security chain tasks – 
analysis, prevention, response and evaluation 
– specific actions are required to perform 
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NGOs and private rhino owners. Communities 
(represented by a variety of tribal authorities 
and political leaders) were not adequately 
represented. The National Integrated Strategy 
to Combat Wildlife Trafficking (NISCWT) is an 
example of a law enforcement strategy that 
embraces a whole-of-government (a part of 
a whole-of-society) approach, which was 
developed before the Rhino Lab. The NISCWT 
strategy is top-down. While there is growing 
awareness of whole-of-society approaches, top-
down planning approaches have a limited ability 
to deal with the complexities of rhino poaching. 
For example, in the Kruger National Park, 
improved surveillance and response capabilities, 
in conjunction with ranger efforts, led to a 
decline in poaching in 2016, but the number 
of attempted incursions detected increased 
dramatically.48 A holistic approach is thus not 
achieved, in part because of the absence of 
local-level interventions that address community 
and other stakeholder needs at the appropriate 
time and bottom-up.49
This methodology should not be seen as linear. 
Learning is an important part of responding to 
complexity in a whole-of-society model, and 
iteration is required throughout intervention 
formulation and rollout. As Parsons points out, 
‘improving policy-making is … about learning, 
rather than command and control’.50 Jumping to 
a solution with only a superficial understanding 
of the problem threatens the intervention. 
Interventions usually need to be ‘separated’ 
in practice, but aligned at the meta and 
holistic levels. This means that interventions 
may overlap. 
Without understanding the profusion of 
worldviews in relation to wildlife crime, the 
same policy recommendations emerge again 
and again with limited impact. A participative, 
facilitated approach that creates new measures 
in the short term and new metaphors in the 
longer term is required. 
each generic task. These tasks contribute 
to the solving of problems and creation 
of opportunities identified in the planning 
approach, or to creating new futures of 
choice, subject to legal and other constraints. 
A problem-solving approach is required at 
inception. This will help build trust, after which 
futures can be discussed. Once vulnerabilities 
have been identified, prevention-related tasks 
can be discussed. Once those tasks have 
been described, the necessary capabilities 
and resources can be identified, and allocated 
to the relevant stakeholders according to 
mandate, cost, strategic importance and other 
considerations.46 To aid this process, an audit of 
stakeholder capabilities may be required. 
The set of tasks and capabilities, and the 
particular allocation to stakeholders is referred to 
as an intervention. The fundamental principle of 
a whole-of-society approach is that interventions 
are developed outside organisational mandates. 
A siloed approach to interventions leads to 
creating (new) undesirable consequences, 
and insufficient resources for implementation. 
At least two possible interventions should be 
developed. Debates between stakeholders 
involved in the selection ensure that the 
consequences of a particular choice are 
understood. The intervention builds on a shared 
understanding of the situation to co-develop a 
shared approach to addressing the problem. 
An intervention also includes defining new 
capabilities required in an organisation. 
The South African national strategic response 
to rhino crime has several interventions: law 
enforcement, community intervention, biological 
management, responsive legislative provisions 
and demand management.47 The Department 
of Environmental Affairs’ Rhino Lab, held from 
14–26 August 2016, sought to develop detailed 
implementation plans for each of these areas. 
The process involved many stakeholders: 
parks, governmental law enforcement agencies, 
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Conclusions and future work
Some progress has been made with certain 
aspects of a whole-of-society approach to 
rhino poaching in South Africa. However, much 
work remains in order to increase levels of 
shared understanding and to create futures 
for wildlife as well as sustainable livelihoods 
for communities. This will take many years to 
build. Where there are examples of community 
interventions, a concept for a local-level, whole-
of-society intervention still requires formulation. 
In proposing the whole-of-society model, 
focused on implementing capabilities, this article 
has made five core points: 
•	 There	is	a	need	to	include	a	range	of	
stakeholders and to engage with their 
different ways of seeing and understanding 
wildlife crime and related aspects. This should 
include knowledge of relevant myths and 
metaphors. Inclusiveness sets interventions 
up to succeed rather than fail. 
•	 Developing	alternative	futures	is	important	
for better long-term outcomes, given the 
complexity of wildlife crime. Futures move 
interventions away from reactive approaches 
alone, instead exploring and planning for 
different outcomes. 
•	 Interventions	should	be	developed	outside	
of organisational mandates. Mandates 
create lenses through which role players 
 see the world in specific ways. Siloed 
approaches lead to undesirable 
consequences and insufficient resources 
 to implement interventions. Intervention 
formulation should include the identification 
of tasks and capabilities, and their allocation 
to stakeholders.
•	 Capability	gaps	must	be	identified	and	
closed. Without the required capabilities, 
the new strategy will not get off the ground. 
Capabilities are determined from the tasks 
required for an intervention. Governance 
should dynamically problem solve and close 
the capability gaps.51 Foresight is important 
for capability building, because it takes time.
•	 Transformation	of	organisational	narratives	is	
important if interventions are to succeed.
These five elements should be at the heart of 
a whole-of-society approach to wildlife crime. 
Lessons learned in this regard can be applied to 
other complex governance problems. 
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